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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 47136-2019

)
)

V.

Ada County Case No. CR01-18-56246

)
)

TABITHA LENE MORGAN
AKA TRUNNELL,

)

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)

ISSUES
1.

Has Trunnell failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
it imposed a uniﬁed sentence of two years, With one year ﬁxed, upon her

When

conviction for aggravated battery?

2.

Has Trunnell

failed to

her Rule 35 motion?

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by denying

ARGUMENT
I.

Trunnell Has Failed

A.

To Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Tabitha Lien

Morgan

(a.k.a.

Trunnell) confronted her eX-husband’s current Wife at a

concert. (PSI, pp.8-17, 67-68.) Trunnell

ground, unconscious. (PSI, pp. 1 6,
into the concrete

ﬂoor

after she

1

punched the

(PSI, p.14.)

her eye and cheek, Which resulted in nerve

The

face causing her to fall to the

17-19.) Trunnell continued to kick and slam the Victim’s head

was unconscious 0n

the scene following the altercation.

woman in the

the ground.

(PSI, pp.67-68.)

The Victim suffered multiple

damage and

scarring.

Trunnell ﬂed

serious injuries to

(PSI, pp.16, 38-40, 50-64, 68.)

State charged Trunnell With aggravated battery, felony, Idaho

Code §§

18-903(a),

907(1)(a). (R., pp.17-18.) Trunnell pled guilty to aggravated battery pursuant t0 a plea agreement.

(R., pp.36-47; Tr., p.6,

L.14 — p.13, L.13.) During sentencing, the State recommended that the

court follow the plea agreement by imposing a uniﬁed sentence often years, With three years ﬁxed,

suspending

all

but one hundred and eighty days and placing Trunnell 0n probation. (R., pp.48-49;

T11, p.17, Ls.3-15.)

Trunnell

recommended probation With an underlying sentence of ﬁve

two years ﬁxed. (TL, p.23, Ls.16-24.) The

district court

imposed a uniﬁed sentence oftwo

with one year ﬁxed. (TL, p.33, Ls.18-21.) Trunnell timely appeals.

B.

Standard

years,

years,

(R., pp.57-63.)

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

that the

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

Will be the defendant's

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where
is

a sentence

is

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

27 (2000)).

When a trial court’s discretionary decision

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine Whether the

lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one 0f discretion;
discretion; (3) acted consistently with

it;

it

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

is

V.

and

(4)

reached

decision

its

by an

(2) acted Within the

any legal standards applicable

boundaries of such

t0 the speciﬁc choices before

exercise of reason. State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

429

P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

C.

Trunnell Has

The
years, With

Shown No Abuse Of The

district court

did not abuse

its

District Court’s Discretion

discretion

it

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of two

one year ﬁxed and one year indeterminate. To carry the burden 0f demonstrating an

abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish
sentence

when

was

excessive.

that,

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

State V. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).

In

determining Whether the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but,

because the decision t0 release the defendant 0n parole

is

m

exclusively the province 0f the executive

branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration.

Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d

at 391).

T0

establish that the sentence

was

excessive, the appellant

must demonstrate

that

reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing
goals 0f protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Faiell, 144 Idaho at 736,

170 P.3d

at

401.

A

sentence

is

reasonable “‘if

it

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary

objective of protecting society and to achieve any or

all

of the related goals of deterrence,

rehabilitation, 0r retribution.”

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

m,

161 Idaho at 895—96, 392 P.3d at 1236—37 (quoting

m

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

The maximum penalty

for aggravated battery

is

ﬁfteen years.

LC.

§

18-908.

concedes that her “sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.” (Appellant’s

Trunnell

brief,

p3.)

Thus, as Trunnell acknowledges, she “‘must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.

State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

is

9”

(Appellant’s brief, p.3 (quoting

475 (2002)).) She cannot do

so.

Her sentence

reasonable in light of LC. § 19-2521, the goals 0f sentencing, and the Violent nature of the

offense.

The record supports

the district court’s exercise 0f

record shows that the district court properly considered and

LC.

§

19-2521.

sentencing discretion.

its

rej ected

During sentencing, the court cited both the

a sentence ofprobation under

criteria for

probation and the criteria for imposing imprisonment under § 19-2521.
afforded weight t0

(1) there

some 0f the

was not “an undue

[Trunnell]

criteria that

risk that during a period

would commit another crime;”

that are unlikely t0 reoccur;”

and

(3) she

(TL, p.32, Ls.1-4, 18-19; p.33, Ls.5-6.)

of the

criteria that

(1) Trunnell’s

favor probation.

placing a defendant 0n

On

one hand, the court

Speciﬁcally, the court found that

0f suspended sentence, or probation, that

(2) Trunnell’s

“conduct was the result of circumstances

was “not a multiple offender or professional

On the

First, the

criminal.”

other hand, the court also gave weight t0 several

favor imposing a term of imprisonment.

Speciﬁcally, the court found:

conduct “caused physical harm to another human;” (2) she had “contemplated

the result” 0f her act; (3) she “did not act under

any strong provocation;”

(4) there

[her]

commission of this offense;”

(6)

.

.

“were not any

substantial grounds tending t0” excuse or justify her criminal conduct; (5) the Victim “in

induced 0r facilitated

.

no way

“a sentence lesser than incarceration

would depreciate

the seriousness 0f [her] crime;” (7) imprisonment

punishment and deterrence” for Trunnel; and
deterrent for others in the

(8)

would “provide appropriate

imprisonment would provide “appropriate

community.” (TL, p.32, L.9 — p.33,

L.4.)

On balance, the court correctly

determined that a term of imprisonment rather than a period 0f probation was necessary.
p.29, L.16

— p.34,

L.1

1.)

Second, the record reveals that in fashioning Trunnell’s sentence, the

The court expressly

considered the goals of sentencing.

stated that

district court

it

properly

was considering

“punishment, deterrence to [Trunnell], deterrence to others, [and Trunnell’s] rehabilitation.”
p.29, Ls.10-13.)

The

(Tr.,

district court also

(T12,

recognized the need t0 protect society. The court stated,

“Here, for whatever reasons, you’re angry and you decide to use Violence against the Victim. That
tells

me

something about your character.”

willing to hurt people

willing to do

it

The court continued, “[A]re you

(Tr., p.30, Ls.8-10.)

when you want t0? And

so that causes

me some

again if those similar circumstances arise.”

concern that you would be

(TL, p.30, Ls.11-14.)

The court

ultimately determined that the objectives 0f punishment and deterrence outweighed the need for

rehabilitation.

The court

stated that

it

needed

[Trunnell’s] decision to seriously injure another

to

impose an “appropriate punishment for

human being

over nothing,” and to deter similar

behavior by sending “a clear message to other people that Whatever people say to them, they don’t
get to respond With physical Violence, particularly, the level that

—

p.31, L.3; p.31, Ls.15-18.)

objectives and give

objectives

them

Because the

differing weights,

district court

it

you chose here.” (TL,

p.30, L.22

has discretion t0 weigh the sentencing

did not abuse

its

discretion

by concluding

that the

0f punishment, deterrence, and protection 0f society outweighed the need for

rehabilitation

0n probation.

E

State V.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998)

(holding the district court did not abuse

its

discretion in concluding that the objectives 0f

punishment, deterrence, and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation).
Finally, the district court’s sentence

“The nature ofthe offense
is

warranted.”

is

was reasonable

in light

0f the nature of the offense.

considered primarily to determine whether the severity of the sentence

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

the nature of the offense,

it is

0f the conduct as well.”

Li.

at 9,

368 P.3d

at

629

not just the actual harm that

(citation omitted).

is

“When

looking

at

considered but the threatened harm

“The nature of the offense and protection of the public

interest

go

hand-in-hand because the level 0f protection required corresponds t0 the severity of the crime.”
State V. Miller, 15 1 Idaho 828, 834—37,

in severe

harm

to the Victim.

264 P.3d 935, 941—44 (201

Trunnell’s attack

1).

Trunnell’s offense resulted

was unprovoked, and knocked her Victim

unconscious. (PSI, pp.16, 117-19.) Even after the Victim was unconscious and defenseless 0n the

ground, Trunnell continued t0 kick her in the head and slam her head into the concrete ﬂoor. (PSI,
pp.67-68.)

damage and

The Victim suffered
scarring.

serious injuries t0 her eye and cheek,

(PSI, pp.16, 38-40, 50-64, 68.)

The court

which resulted

also considered the potential 0r

threatened harm, stating, “[Trunnell] and the Victim are both fortunate that the Victim

more

severely.

in nerve

was not hurt

Ms. [Trunnell]’s actions could have caused her permanent brain damage or could

have killed her.” (Aug. R., p.3 .) Given the Violent nature 0f Trunnell’s offense, the record supports
the reasonableness of a one-year

ﬁxed

sentence.

Because the record amply supports the
warranted 0r appropriate, the

district court

district court’s

determination that probation was not

properly exercised

its

sentencing discretion

When

it

imposed a reasonable sentence of one year ﬁxed, with one year indeterminate.
Trunnell erroneously argues that the district court imposed an excessive sentence “in light

0fthe mitigating factors, including the absence 0f any criminal record, employment history, family

and friend support, lack 0f mental health 0r substance abuse
responsibility

and remorse.” (Appellant’s

failed to exercise reason

brief, p.7.)

brief, pp.4, 7.)

issues,

and acceptance of

According to Trunnell, “the

by not giving sufﬁcient weight to these mitigating

This argument lacks merit. The record shows that the

district court

factors.” (Appellant’s

district court

did consider the

mitigating factors that Trunnell relies on in her appeal. In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the
court considered Trunnell’s lack 0f prior criminal history, her remorse, her level 0f education and

GAIN

employment, the

L9;

p.28, L.15

—

assessment, and her LSI score.

The court simply did not

p.29, L4.)

Trunnell desires, but that does not

(Tr., p.15, Ls.1 1-18; p.19,

its

—

p.24,

afford these mitigating factors the weight

show an abuse 0f discretion. Considering

information, the district court acted well within

L.21

all

discretion in concluding that a

0f the relevant

uniﬁed sentence

0f two years, With one year ﬁxed was necessary t0 punish and deter Trunnell, deter others, and to
protect society.

II.

Trunnell Has Failed

A.

Show That The

District Court Abused
Request For Leniencv

Its

Discretion

By Denying Her

Introduction

After timely appealing the district court’s judgment 0f conviction and commitment,
Trunnell ﬁled a motion for reconsideration of sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R.,
pp.57-63, 65) Trunnell supported the motion With a handwritten letter requesting leniency. (R.,
pp.66-69.)

The

district court

Standard

B.

denied her motion. (Aug. R., pp.1-3.)

Of Review

“‘If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a

35

is

a plea for leniency, and

motion for reduction 0f sentence under Rule

we review the denial of the motion for an abuse 0f discretion. ’”

State

V. Grant,

154 Idaho 281, 288, 297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting State

203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007));

385

ﬂ

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

also State V. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517,

App. 2015) (“A motion for reduction 0f sentence under I.C.R. 35

(Ct.

When

leniency, addressed t0 the sound discretion of the court”).

decision

is

a

is

trial

415 P.3d 381,

essentially a plea for

court’s discretionary

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry t0 determine

Whether the lower court:

(1) perceived the issue as

one 0f discretion;

(2) acted within the

boundaries 0f such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
speciﬁc choices before

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

exercise 0f reason.

State V. Herrera,

164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
In conducting a review “0f the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion,

we

consider the entire

record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original
sentence.” Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517, 415 P.3d at 385.

Trunnell Has

C.

Shown No Abuse Of The

District Court’s Discretion

Trunnell concedes that her “sentence does not exceed the

maximum,”

so she must

show

that the denial

court’s discretion. (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The

“When
light

district court

did not abuse

its

statutory

of the Rule 35 motion was an abuse of the

She has

failed to

discretion

when

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must

d0

it

denied Trunnell’s Rule 35 motion.

show

State V. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729,

district

so.

that the sentence is excessive in

of new or additional information subsequently provided t0 the

Rule 35 motion.”

[ﬁfteen-year]

district court in

support 0f the

316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013)

quotations omitted). First, the record belies Trunnell’s claim that she provided

(internal

“new and additional

information to support her request for probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Her

letter,

Which was

submitted in support of her Rule 35 motion, merely expresses her “deep remorse and great regret”

for her actions, requests the court “take another 100k at [her]

“ready to begin [her] probation.”

This information

(R., pp.67-69.)

information showing that her sentence

is

PSI report,” and suggests the she

new

not

is

is

or additional

The court had already considered Trunnell’s

excessive.

remorse, her requests for probation, and the PSI. (TL, p. 1 5, Ls.1 1-18; p.24, Ls. 14-22; p.29, Ls.1619.)

The

district court

district court

was not required

did not abuse

its

discretion

t0 reduce Trunnell’s sentence

“that the court

p.3.)

The

demonstrates that she

still

in deciding

is

excessive does not

place [her] on probation” because in the court’s
t0 mitigate the small risk that [she] will

When

(Aug. R., p.3.) Trunnell

is

it

imposed sentence.

1

E

discretion

acts, acts

commit a
.

.

.

was

little

.

.

recommendation

t0

a period 0f probation “could

similar act in the future.”

(Aug. R., p.3.)

deter not only [Trunell], but also others,

from

whose consequences sometimes cannot be undone.”

weighed most heavily

by denying her Rule 35 request

in this case.

Thus, the

district court

did not

for probation.

229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (afﬁrming district court’s
Where defendant “c1aim[ed] he ha[d] new evidence in the form 0f honest
the sentencing hearing, [the defendant] expressed remorse for his crime”).

State V. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773,

denial of Rule 35 motion

remorse” because, “at

there

.

Notwithstanding

not entitled t0 probation, and probation would not ﬁllﬁll the sentencing

objectives the district court

its

mind

was speciﬁcally “designed t0

committing Violent and dangerous

abuse

it

an appropriate sentence.” (Aug. R.,

Trunnell’s request for leniency, the district court had already “rejected the

Trunnell’s sentence

make

properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors in conjunction with

sentencing obj ectives, as well as LC. § 19-2521

do

Thus the

does not understand the purpose of her sentence 0r

must consider more than her needs

district court

1

the motion.

by denying

Second, that Trunnell believes her sentence 0f imprisonment
so. Trunnell’s letter

on those bases.

9

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofconviction and the order

denying motion to reconsider sentence 0f the

district court.

DATED this 6th day of November, 2019.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of November, 2019,

copy 0f the attached
iCourt File and Serve:
correct

served a true and

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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